Aristotle and Theophrastus on the Emotions

Fortenbaugh here revisits his 1975 study, Aristotle on Emotion, incorporating the contributions of Theophrastus to the Peripatetic synthesis of analyses of the emotions. He modifies earlier views, adding new analyses and illustrative material, replying to criticisms of his positions. A.P

Theophrastus on Emotion

While Aristotle\u27s treatment of emotion has in recent years received considerable attention, Theophrastus\u27 work on the same subject has been mostly ignored. The reason for this neglect is that the relevant material has not been readily accessible, but with the publication of my Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts that obstacle has been largely removed. Texts whose primary focus is emotional response have been brought together under the heading Affecte (L1-L11) and other relevant texts are included elsewhere in the volume. My purpose here is to call attention to this material and to use it to advance our understanding of Peripatetic work on emotion. We shall see that Theophrastus\u27 treatment of emotion is Aristotelian, and yet of special interest, for it involves analyzing closely related emotions in terms of the more and less. We shall look closely at the emotion of fault-finding, observe parallels with Theophrastus\u27 classification of plants, and in the end have a better understanding of why the Greek commentator Aspasius found no definition of pathos among the older Peripatetics

On the Antecedents of Aristotle\u27s Bipartite Psychology

This paper will be concerned with the antecedents of Aristotle\u27s bipartite or moral psychology. It will consider two common theses: 1) Aristotle\u27s bipartite psychology is in origin a popular psychology already present (if not clearly formulated) in Euripides\u27 Medea; 2) Aristotle\u27s bipartite psychology developed out of tripartition by collapsing together the two lower elements of tripartition. Roughly, I shall be affirming the first and rejecting the second thesis. In both cases I hope to develop and make more precise the origins of Aristotle\u27s bipartite psychology

Cicero, On Invention 1.51-77: Hypothetical Syllogistic and the Early Peripatetics

In the course of this paper, I shall say some things about Cicero’s discussion of induction, but my primary concern will be with his account of deduction. In particular, I want to call attention to Cicero’s argument for a quinquepartite analysis of deductive reasoning (Ded. 3). It is remarkable in that it makes elaborate use of the mixed hypothetical syllogism, and also of some importance in that it supplements our evidence for early Peripatetic interest in syllogisms of this land. Recent scholarship on the history of ancient logic has generally focused on later sources—like Alexander of Aphrodisias, Boethius, Philoponus and Simplicius— and pointed to Theophrastus as a significant contributor to the development of hypothetical syllogistic. Cicero, writing three centuries before Alexander, seems not only to confirm the importance of Theophrastus but also to indicate that his contributions were recognized as such by Hellenistic rhetoricians. In presenting this thesis, I shall not be accepting Cicero’s claim to have written more accurately and diligently than others (Ded. 7), but I will suggest that the argument in favor of quinquepaitite analysis (Ded. 3) is more coherent than what precedes (Ded. 2) and that this difference is largely attributable to Cicero’s use of sources

On the Antecedents of Aristotle’s Bipartite Psychology

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Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts

Includes bibliographical references (p. [356]-375) and index.Fragments in Greek and Latin with commentary in German